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Privacy-enhanced keyword search in clouds
Abstract
The advent of cloud computing has dramatically changed the IT scene, as it offers cost savings and
improvements to major operations. Nevertheless, the major obstacle relies on the effort on how to secure
sensitive data files that are outsourced to the cloud environment. To ensure confidentiality, the sensitive
data are usually encrypted prior to being outsourced. Nevertheless, effective data utilization remains a
challenging task and there is a clear need for a secure and efficient searching mechanism over the
encrypted data in the cloud, to increase the us-ability of the secure cloud environment. Unfortunately,
existing work in the area of secure searching in the outsourcing scenario usually incur high computational
complexity, which makes the approach impractical. In this paper, we take one step ahead by proposing an
efficient keyword search scheme for cloud computing. Our solution is very lightweight, and it enables
efficient multi-user keyword search over outsourced data files in the cloud environment, without leaking
any private information about both the data owner and users in the search query. We formally define the
security requirements and prove that our scheme is secure under a simple assumption in the standard
model.
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Privacy-Enhanced Keyword Search in Clouds
Miao Zhou, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, Man Ho Au

Abstract—The advent of cloud computing has dramatically
changed the IT scene, as it offers cost savings and improvements
to major operations. Nevertheless, the major obstacle relies
on the effort on how to secure sensitive data ﬁles that are
outsourced to the cloud environment. To ensure conﬁdentiality,
the sensitive data are usually encrypted prior to being outsourced.
Nevertheless, effective data utilization remains a challenging task
and there is a clear need for a secure and efﬁcient searching
mechanism over the encrypted data in the cloud, to increase
the usability of the secure cloud environment. Unfortunately,
existing works in the area of secure searching in the outsourcing
scenario usually incur high computational complexity, which
makes the approach impractical. In this paper, we take a further
step by proposing an efﬁcient keyword search scheme for cloud
computing. Our solution is very simple, and it enables efﬁcient
multi-user keyword search over outsourced data ﬁles in the cloud
environment, without leaking any private information about
either the data owner or users in the search query. We formally
deﬁne the security requirements and prove that our scheme is
secure under a simple assumption in the standard model.
Index Terms—Keyword search, cloud computing lightweight.

I. INTRODUCTION
Due to its low cost, robustness and ﬂexibility, cloud computing changes the way entities manage their data and offers individuals and companies with affordable storage, professional
maintenance and adjustable space. Among the four cloud
computing deployed models that includes: public, private,
community and hybrid, public cloud where the outsourced
resources can be accessed by the general public has gain
a dramatic growth. By using a public cloud, a variety of
users could access or share information that are stored in the
cloud, independent of their different locations. Meanwhile, it
also makes effective data utilization a challenging task as the
outsourced data are usually in the encrypted form.
To set the scene, let us consider the following scenario.
Let us consider a user Alice who uses a public cloud to
store her personal data ﬁles such as family photos, blogs and
working documents. To prevent the cloud server from learning
the contents, she encrypts all her ﬁles prior to sending her
data to the cloud. Once a while, she would like to access her
ﬁles from different devices, such as a Boxee Box, an Apple
TV or even her iPhone. Naturally, Alice would not remember
all the contents that she has stored in the cloud. Therefore,
there is a need for efﬁcient searching over her outsourced
ﬁles using the appropriate keywords. Since some of her mobile
devices are only equipped with limited computational power,
the searching mechanism should be very efﬁcient, and it
should ideally avoid using the relatively expensive techniques
in public key cryptography, such as bilinear pairings. In other
some cases, she would also like to share some of the ﬁles with
her family and friends. For example, data ﬁles with labels
“family” and “friends” from Alice would be accessible by

her family member and friends, respectively. However, this
requires Alice to deﬁne whom her family and friends are
and requires the cloud server to enforce access control. This
requirement may burden the regular users with the required
expensive operations, and it may also reveal some information
with regards to Alice’s social networks.
In other words, we are looking for a practical scheme that
provides:
• an efﬁcient data search, and
• a simple access control.
a) Overview of Our Approach.: It turns out that a simple
and straightforward approach could ﬁt Alice’s requirements.
Before outsourcing each data ﬁle, Alice attaches a ‘hidden
index’ h related to a certain keyword w to it. The hidden index
h is computed as H(w) for a hash function H using a keyword
w. This can be easily extended to the multi-keyword case
where each ﬁle F is attached with several hidden indexes for
the relevant keywords. In order to search all ﬁles related to a
keyword w∗ , Alice compute h∗ = H(w∗ ) and sends h∗ to the
cloud, who returns all the data ﬁles attached with hidden index
h∗ . This idea can be used for simple access control as well. For
instance, data ﬁles to be shared with Alice’s friends could be
attached be a hidden index with w =“friends”. Alice’s friends
could then access those ﬁles using “friends” as the searching
keyword. In this case a keyword plays the role of a password.
Unfortunately, this approach is inadequate in terms of the
keyword search as well as a simple access control. Firstly, it
leaks some information about the keyword to the cloud since
the cloud can guess the keywords by testing whether the hash
of it matches with the hidden index. Secondly, the keyword
are human-memorable and is thus suspectable to the guessing
attack. This is thus unsuitable even for a simple access control
purpose.
One possible way to deal with these vulnerabilities is
to generate a random value ti for each possible keyword
wi . Since ti is completely random, the scheme will not be
vulnerable to the guessing attack. The drawback is apparent.
Alice is required to build up a look up table which links every
keyword to its corresponding random number. Firstly, the table
could be large if Alice would set the ﬁle name as keyword
(which is natural since this would allow her to search using
the ﬁle name). Secondly, Alice has to keep an up-to-date copy
of the table in all her devices.
Finally, we tackle the above issue by the use of the pseudorandom function (P RF). Instead of generating a random value
ti for each possible keyword wi , Alice computes ti as the
output of the pseudo-random function with input wi and a
secret seed s. The value of s is kept secret and is stored in all
Alice’s devices. Indeed, the issue of storing the look up table
has been reduced to just storing merely one secret seed s.

We call our system simple privacy-enhanced keyword
search in clouds (SPEKS ) to emphasize its simplicity. The
term privacy-enhanced is used to reﬂect the privacy guarantee
about our scheme. The cloud server can still tell if two
data ﬁles share the same keyword. Exact security guarantee
provided by our system will be formalized in subsequent
sections.
b) Paper Organization.: The rest of the paper will be
organized as follows. In Section II, we present related work.
Formalization of security requirements are developed in In
Section III. Our construction and security analysis are given
in Section IV. In Section V, we estimate the performance of
our scheme. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing works close to ours can be found in the areas
of “searching with privacy” and “searching on private-keyencrypted data”. In theory, the classical work of Goldreich
and Ostrovsky [9] on oblivious RAMs can resolve the problem
of doing (private) searches on remote encrypted data, where
oblivious RAMs hide all information about the RAM use
from a remote and potentially malicious server with a polylogarithmic overhead in all parameters (including computation
and communication). Although their scheme is asymptotically
efﬁcient and nearly optimal, it does not appear to be efﬁcient
in practice as large constants are hidden in the big-O notation.
In an effort to reduce the round complexity associated with
oblivious RAMs, Song, Wagner and Perrig [15] presented a
solution for searchable encryption and after that how to do
keyword searches on encrypted data efﬁciently was raised.
In [15], they achieved searchable encryption by constructing
a special two-layered encryption for each word. Given a
trapdoor, the server can strip the outer layer and assert whether
the inner layer is the correct form. The limitations in this
construction are as follows. First, it is not compatible with
existing ﬁle encryption schemes and a speciﬁc encryption
method must be used; second, while the construction is proven
to be a secure encryption scheme, it is not proven to be a
secure searchable encryption scheme and the distribution of
the underlying plaintexts is vulnerable to statistical attacks,
that is, their approach may leak the locations of the keyword in
a ﬁle; ﬁnally, searching is linear in the length of the document
collection.
The above limitations are addressed by Goh [10], Chang
and Mitzenmacher [6] and also Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and
Ostrovsky [7], etc. In [10], they built an index of keywords for
each ﬁle using a Bloom ﬁlter with pseudo-random functions
used as hash functions. One inherent problem with this Bloomﬁlter-based approach is that Bloom ﬁlters can induce false
positives, which would potentially cause mobile users to
download extra ﬁles not containing the keyword. In [6], Chang
and Mitzenmacher achieved the notion of security to IND2CKA for chosen keyword attack, except that it also tries to
guarantee that the trapdoors do not leak any information about
the words being queried. In [7], they proposed a multi-user
construction that is efﬁcient on server’s side, however every

node in the link list has to be augmented with information
about the ﬁle index of the next node.
In a different direction, Boneh, di Crescenzo, Ostvrosky and
Persiano [3] and Boneh, Kuchilevitz, Ostvrosky and Skeith
[4] studied the problem of how to search on data encrypted
by a public-key cryptosystem. These schemes are motivated
by an encrypted email system. Their constructions, however,
have an overhead in search time that is proportional to the
square root of the database size, which is far less efﬁcient
then the best private-key solutions. Boneh et al.’s approach
[3] is known to be the seminal public key encryption scheme
with keyword search (PEKS). It was observed in [2] that
Boneh et al.’s scheme [3] requires a secure channel, which
makes it impractical. Hence, Baek, Susilo and Safavi-Naini [2]
proposed the notion of secure-channel-free PEKS to improve
this drawback. This work has been further extended and
revised in the recent literature, such as [12], [13]. Byun et
al. [5] suggested the notion of a keyword-guessing attack and
showed that the existing schemes are insecure against this
attack, given that the number of possible keywords is bounded
by some polynomial. They provided an open problem on how
to construct a PEKS with designated veriﬁer that is secure
against keyword-guessing attacks. This question was answered
afﬁrmatively in [13]. In order to realize the practicality of
PEKS, the combination of a public key encryption scheme
with PEKS to make a single integrated entity has been studied
in [1].
III. MODEL
In this section, we formalize the notion of SPEKS and its
security requirements.
A. Syntax
SPEKS is a tuple of ﬁve algorithms, namely, ParamGen,
KeyGen, IndexGen, TokenGen, Test, whose deﬁnition is given
below.
• ParamGen. On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs a system-wide parameter PARAM. We
assume PARAM is an implicit to all the algorithms below.
• KeyGen. This algorithm outputs a secret key s.
∗
• IndexGen. On input a keyword w ∈ {0, 1} , a secret key
s, this algorithm outputs a value h. The value h is called
a hidden index.
∗
• TokenGen. On input a keyword w ∈ {0, 1} , a secret key
s, this algorithm outputs a value ω. The value ω is called
a hidden token.
• Test. On input a hidden index h, a hidden token ω, this
algorithm outputs 1 or 0.
As usual, correctness is of SPEKS is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Correctness): For any λ and any keyword w,
Test(PARAM, h, ω) = 1 if there exists ParamGen(λ) =
PARAM , s = KeyGen( PARAM ), h = IndexGen( PARAM , s, w)
and ω = TokenGen(PARAM, s, w).
B. Typical Use of SPEKS
We brieﬂy explain how a user Alice and the cloud server
employ the algorithms in a typical scenario. Firstly, the

Setup Challenger C invokes

cloud server invokes ParamGen to generate the parameters1 .
Alice invokes KeyGen to create her secret key s. Before
outsourcing her data ﬁles F to the cloud server, Alice would
choose several suitable keywords, say, w1 , ..., wn and invokes
hF,i = IndexGen(s, wi ). She submits F along with hF,i to the
cloud. F is possibly the encryption of Alice’s data. How F is
generated is out of scope of this paper.
When Alice would like to search her ﬁles from the cloud
with keyword w∗ , she invokes ω ∗ = TokenGen(s, w∗ ) and
submits ω ∗ to the cloud. The cloud returns all the ﬁles associated with hidden index hF,i such that Test(hF,i , ω ∗ ) = 1.
Alice could share her ﬁles with keyword w∗ to others by giving
them the value ω ∗ .

•

C. A SPEKS System

•

Challenge Phase A submits two keywords w0 , w1 .
C ﬂips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes hb =
IndexGen(PARAM, s, wb ). hb is returned to A as the
challenge.

•

Query Phase 2 A can issue the same type of queries as
in Query Phase 1 except it cannot submit queries with
input w0 and w1 .

In this section, we describe our SPEKS system. Essentially,
the scheme can be divided into two phases, namely Setup
and Search. We should highlight that the cloud user’s storage
only consists of a small and constant value, in addition to the
keywords.
• Setup: The cloud server S runs the algorithm ParamGen
to outputs a system-wide parameter PARAM. The cloud
user U runs the algorithm KeyGen to generate the secret
key s. U then runs the algorithm IndexGen and algorithm
TokenGen to generate the hidden index h and hidden
token ω. Then U may now delete the original data ﬁles
from his/her local storage.
• Search: When the cloud user U requests to search for a
hidden token ω:
1) S computes H(ω).
2) S runs the algorithm Test, checks whether there is
a hidden index h equals with H(ω), and sends U
back the found data ﬁle.
When a friend F of U requests to search for a keyword
wi :
1) F sends the keyword wi to U and U can returns
the hidden token ω.
2) F sends ω to S.
3) S computes H(ω), checks whether there is a h that
matches with H(ω), and returns the corresponding
data ﬁle to F .
D. Security Requirements
Two security requirements are identiﬁed for SPEKS . The
ﬁrst one regards privacy. Speciﬁcally, no one, not even the
cloud server, should be able to obtain information about the
underlying keyword given the hidden token and hidden index.
The second one concerns about the basic access control. No
one should be able to compute the hidden token given the
hidden index. We formalize these two requirements using
security game played between a challenger C and an adversary
A.
Game Privacy.
1 We note that Alice could generate the parameters, but in this case, the
cloud server is required to store a number of parameters since the cloud
server needs to serve multiple users.

ParamGen(1λ ) = PARAM, and KeyGen(PARAM) = s.
PARAM
•

is given to the adversary A.

Query Phase 1 A can issue two types of queries:
1) Index Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with
IndexGen(PARAM, s, w).
2) Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with
TokenGen(PARAM, s, w).

Output A outputs a guess bit b . We say A wins the
game if b = b .
The advantage of A in Game Privacy is deﬁned as the
probability that A wins minus 1/2.
•

Game Authenticity.
• Setup Challenger C invokes
ParamGen(1λ ) = PARAM and KeyGen(PARAM) = s.
PARAM
•

is given to the adversary A.

Query Phase 1 A can issue two types of queries:
1) Index Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with
IndexGen(PARAM, s, w).
2) Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with
TokenGen(PARAM, s, w).

•

•

Challenge Phase A submits one keyword w . C computes
h = IndexGen(PARAM, s, w ). h is returned to A as the
challenge.
Query Phase 2 A can issue the same type of queries as
in Query Phase 1 except it cannot submit queries with
input w .

Output A outputs a value ω  . A wins the game if
Test(PARAM, h , ω  ) = 1.
The advantage of A in Game Authenticity is deﬁned as the
probability that A wins.
Deﬁnition 2: (Security) A construction of SPEKS is secure
if no PPT adversary A can win Game Privacy or Game
Authenticity with non-negligible advantage.
•

IV. O UR C ONSTRUCTION OF SPEKS

•

We detail our construction of SPEKS in this section. We
will ﬁrst review the notion of hash function and pseudorandom function, which are the basic building blocks of our
construction. We shall also give security analysis in after
presenting our construction.

•

A. Building Blocks
•

•

Hash Function. Hash functions are compressing functions
that take a variable size input and return a ﬁxed size output. Our construction relies on a one-way cryptographic
hash function H. That is, given y, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd x
such that y = H(x).
Pseudo-random Function. The pseudo-random function
(P RF) was ﬁrst deﬁned by [8]. It is a family of functions
with the property that the input-output behavior of a
random instance of the family is computationally indistinguishable from that of a random function. Informally
speaking, given a random seed s, the function deﬁned by
P RF(s, ·) is indistinguishable to a random function R(·).

B. Our Construction
•
•

•
•
•

ParamGen. On input λ, output a one-way hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ .
KeyGen. Randomly pick a pseudo-random function P RF :
{0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ and a bitstring s ∈R {0, 1}λ
and output s.
IndexGen. On input w and s, output h = H(P RF(s, w)).
TokenGen. On input w and s, output ω = P RF(s, w).
Test. On input a hidden index h and a hidden token ω,
output 1 if and only if h = H(ω) and 0 otherwise.

C. Security Proof
Theorem 1: Our construction of SPEKS is secure if the
pseudo-random function P RF employed is secure and the hash
function H employed is one-way.
Proof: The proof is divided into two parts. In the ﬁrst
part, we show that if there exists an adversary A that has
non-negligible probability in wining Game Privacy, we can
construct a simulator S that distinguish a pseudo-random
function P RF from a random function R. In the second part,
we show that if there exists an adversary A that has nonnegligible probability in wining Game Authenticity, we can
construct a simulator S that breaks the one-way property of
the hash function H.
Privacy.
• Setup S is given a function F and its goal is to distinguish if F is a random function or not. Suppose with
probability 1/2 S is given a truly random function. S
can query the function F adaptively. S chooses a oneway hash function H and set H as PARAM.
• Query Phase 1 S answers the queries as follows.
1) Index Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies
with H(F (w)) by querying F .
2) Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with F (w) by querying F .

•

Challenge Phase A submits two keywords w0 , w1 . S
ﬂips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes hb = H(F (w)).
hb is returned to A
Query Phase 2 S answer A’s queries in the same way
as in Query Phase 1.
Output A outputs a guess bit b .

If A guess correctly, S concludes F is not a random function.
Otherwise, S concluded F is a random function. Suppose A
wins with probability 1/2 + , probability that S distinguishes
correctly is 1/2 + /2. The reason is that if F is a random
function, probability that A wins is exactly 1/2 since hb
contains no information about b. On the other hand, if F is
not a random function, A can win with probability 1/2 + .
Thus, S answer correctly with probability 1/2 + /2.
Authenticity. We use a simply game-hoping [14]. In the ﬁrst
game, denoted as Game Authenticity Real, the behavior of S
is described below.
•
•

Setup S chooses a pseudo-random function P RF with
seed s and a hash function H. H is given to A as PARAM.
Query Phase 1 S answers the queries as follows.
1) Index Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies
with H(P RF(s, w)).
2) Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with P RF(s, w).

•
•
•

Challenge Phase A submits one keywords w . S returns
hb = H(P RF(s, w )) to A.
Query Phase 2 S answer A’s queries in the same way
as in Query Phase 1.
Output A outputs a guess bit b .

In the second game, Game Authenticity Modiﬁed, S’s
behavior is deﬁned as follows.
•

•

Setup S is given a hash function H, a value y and its
goal is compute a value x such that y = H(x). S gives
A H as PARAM.
Query Phase 1 For every keyword w submitted by A, S
chooses a random value rw and maintains a list of tuples
(w, rw ). S then answers the queries as follows.
1) Index Query: A submits a keyword w and S replies
with H(rw )
2) Token Query: A submits a keyword w and C replies
with rw

•
•
•

Challenge Phase A submits one keyword w . S returns
y to A.
Query Phase 2 S answer A’s queries in the same way
as in Query Phase 1.
Output A outputs a value ω  .

A wins if and only if H(ω  ) = y. Thus, S outputs x = ω 
as the pre-image of y. It remains to argue the advantage of A
in Game Authenticity Real and Game Authenticity Modiﬁed
are the same. A simple argument will do. If the advantage of
A in both games are difference, it is straight-forward to use
A to distinguishes P RF from a truly random function.

V. PERFORMANCE
Efﬁciency It is straightforward to see our construction of
SPEKS is very efﬁcient. Generation of a hidden index requires
evaluation of one hash function and one pseudo-random function. Generation of a hidden token requires evaluation of one
pesudo-random function. Testing if a hidden token matches
with a hidden index requires evaluation of one hash function.
Since both hash function and pseudorandom function can be
implemented efﬁciently by heuristic algorithms, all operations
of our SPEKS can be conducted efﬁciently. Indeed, they are
computable even by low power hand-held devices. As for the
storage, the data owner will be required to store one secret
seed s. Thus, our system is very efﬁcient and practical.
VI. CONCLUSION
We constructed an efﬁcient SPEKS , which is suitable for
keyword search in the cloud environment. Comparing with
the existing keyword search schemes such as [11], [16], our
construction is much more efﬁcient on both sides of the data
owner and cloud servers. In addition, our scheme comes with
a security guarantee in the standard model.
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